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Abstract
Is there a theoretical basis for the view that the end of a period of over-investment
necessarily leads to a period of below-normal employment as the excess capital stock
is run down? We study the repercussions of a false boom in housing driven by prior
expectations of future housing prices not justied by fundamentals. When these ex-
pectations are corrected, the result is a precipitous drop in housing prices and, on that
account alone, some drop in employment. There is also a bulge in the housing stock.
In the closed economy case, the downward shift of the term structure of interest rates
due to the excess housing stock props up housing prices above the normal steady-state
level, so the drop of housing prices \undershoots." Although this transient elevation
of housing prices has a positive demand-wage eect on employment, we show that the
wealth eect from owning a higher housing stock and a negative Hicks-Lucas-Rapping
eect of lower interest rates dominate, so employment drops initially to a below-normal
level. The slump gradually subsides as the housing overhang wears o. In the case of a
small open economy that faces a world of perfect capital mobility and takes as given the
world interest rate, there are two possibilities. If housing services are instantaneously
tradeable and perfect substitutes for foreign ones, so purchasing power parity holds, the
end of the bubble causes housing prices to drop precisely to the steady-state level. Since
there is no undershooting, the wealth eect of the housing overhang is unopposed and
the slump is deeper. If domestic and foreign housing services are imperfect substitutes,
the country will suer a period with a weak real exchange rate, thus to a drop of housing
prices that \overshoots" the normal level. Here the slump in employment is worsened
by the exaggerated fall in housing prices below the steady-state level.
JEL classication: E13, E22, E23, E24, R21, R31
Keywords: Housing stock, housing prices, over-investment, employment
1. Introduction
Since the modern economy is one that is fraught with novelty, asset prices can turn out to have
traveled along disequilibrium paths where expectations of the future turn out to be wrong.
This may be one way to describe a \bubble." In this paper, we focus on housing as a major
asset. When the bubble comes to an end and the economy nds itself with \too much" housing
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stock, what does formal theory predict about the level of employment and housing prices in
the post-bubble era? In this paper, we aim to answer this basic question. We study this
question rst in a closed economy and then in a small open economy operating in a world of
perfect international capital mobility that takes the world interest rate as given. We nd that
what happens to aggregate employment and the level of housing prices in the post-bubble
era depends on whether we are looking at a closed economy or a small open economy. In the
former, the whole term structure of interest rates must adjust to induce individuals in the
economy to willingly hold the excess housing stock, which aects housing prices. In the latter,
if foreign and domestic housing services are perfectly substitutable, the possibility of leasing
the excess stock of housing to foreigners (letting New Yorkers live in London or vice versa)
and transfer of home ownership to foreigners allow equilibration to occur at the given world
interest rate. However, when domestic and foreign housing services are imperfect substitutes,
the equilibration in the face of excess housing stock (assumed to occur only in the home
country) requires an adjustment in the real exchange rate with further consequences for the
behavior of housing prices and aggregate employment.
More precisely, in the closed economy, we nd that the sudden end of a boom due to
prior expectations of even higher housing prices in the future that are not ultimately justi-
ed by fundamentals results in a precipitous drop in housing prices followed by a period of
below-normal aggregate employment|an outright slump. Although housing prices drop pre-
cipitously with the end of the bubble, we nd that the downward shift of the term structure
of interest rates in the closed economy leaves housing prices above the steady-state level so
there is undershooting. The unusually low interest rates in the post-bubble era, therefore,
serve to prop up housing prices and mitigate the fall in employment via a positive wage eect.
Nevertheless, we show that the wealth eect of a higher housing stock on demand for leisure
as well as a Hicks-Lucas-Rapping interest-rate eect on labor supply overcome the positive
wage eect so the end of the bubble is followed unambiguously by a slump in employment. In
the case of a small open economy where foreign and domestic housing services are perfectly
substitutable so that purchasing power parity holds, we nd that housing prices drop to the
steady-state level so there is neither undershooting nor overshooting. Nevertheless, there is
still a slump in employment due to a pure wealth eect. However, when domestic and foreign
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housing services are imperfect substitutes, the possibility of a period of weak real exchange
rates caused by the excess housing stock (in the home country) leads to overshooting|a drop
of housing prices below the steady-state level|further weakening employment.1
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we set up the basic neoclassical
model of housing demand and supply where housing stock is the only nonhuman asset and
the economy is closed. Then in section 3, we study the small open economy exhibiting perfect
international capital mobility. We study two cases in the small open economy, one where
foreign and domestic housing services are perfectly substitutable and another where they are
imperfect substitutes. Section 4 concludes.
2. The basic closed-economy model of housing, employment, and interest
The economy comprises of individuals who all face a constant and equal probability of death
per unit time denoted  (see Blanchard [1985]).2 A new cohort is born at each instant of time
with individuals facing the same probability of death, . The cohort size is suciently large
that the size of each cohort declines deterministically through time. By normalizing the size
of each new cohort to equal , total population (also equal to the total size of the labor force)
at time t is given by
R t
 1  exp
 (t s) ds = 1. With this normalization, aggregate variables are
also interpretable as per-capita variables.
Individuals purchase insurance policies that take the form of receiving payments from the
insurance company when alive and turning over their estate to the company upon death. With
an actuarially fair scheme, a member who is alive receives the payment  in exchange for the
insurance company's claim of one unit of good contingent on death.
Let the period-t utility function of an individual born at time s be given by A 1 log(L  
l(s; t))+log h(s; t)+B: Here, A and B are positive parameters, L is total time endowment and
l(s; t) is individual labor supply. We note that individuals in this model are not bequeathed
with nonhuman wealth at birth and thus start life with a positive supply of labor. As worker-
savers, they accumulate nonhuman wealth through their lifetime leaving the possibility that
there would exist individuals who become so wealthy that they would use up all their time
1For a careful examination of the data relating to investments and jobs, see Zoega (2010).
2See also Obstfeld (1989) and Weil (1989).
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endowment for leisure. This would make it dicult to derive an aggregate labor supply
schedule.3 To avoid this aggregation problem, we assume that while additional hours spent
at market work leads directly to a loss of utility as time available for leisure declines in the
traditional way, spending a positive amount of time in market work also gives a positive xed
amount of utility that is subsumed in the term B that the activity of home production does
not give. This positive xed utility from being in the workforce captures the value obtainable
from social interactions with colleagues at the workplace as well as mental stimulus from
solving problems not normally found from homework. We relegate to the Appendix a formal
derivation of the utility function used above as a reduced-form expression from a more basic
problem involving utility derivable from consuming a home-produced good.4
To ensure that every living person in the economy spends a positive amount of time working
in the market in order to facilitate aggregation, we make the following assumption:
Assumption 1: B > A 1[log L  log(L  0+)]:
Under Assumption 1, a very wealthy individual who might have chosen to retire in a model
without a positive utility value from market work spends a very small positive amount of time
working in the market (lm = 0
+ > 0) given the positive utility value of market work compared
to housework in our model. Setting the factor of proportionality relating the consumption of
housing services to the stock of housing equal to one, h(s; t) is the stock of houses giving the
equivalent amount of housing services to the individual.
At time 0, the individual's intertemporal optimization problem can be written as
Maximize
Z 1
0
fA 1[log(L  l(s; t))] + log h(s; t) +Bg exp (+)t dt
subject to _w(s; t) = [r(t) + ]w(s; t) + v(t)l(s; t) R(t)h(s; t);
given w(s; 0):
3See Hoon (2011) for a discussion of this problem.
4For a model using an incentive-wage labor market, see Hoon and Phelps (1996).
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Here w(s; t) is the individual's nonhuman wealth, r(t) is the interest rate,  is the actuarially
fair premium rate,  is the subjective rate of time preference, v(t) is the wage rate, and R(t)
is the housing rental rate.
Solving the individual's intertemporal problem gives the following optimal conditions:
A 1
L  l(s; t) = v(t)(s; t); (1)
1
h(s; t)
= R(t)(s; t); (2)
_(s; t)
(s; t)
=  [r(t)  ]; (3)
lim
T!1
(s; T )w(s; T ) exp (+)T = 0; (4)
where (s; t) is the co-state variable. Combining (1) and (2), and eliminating (s; t), we obtain
hd(s; t) =
Av(t)[L  ls(s; t)]
R(t)
: (5)
We can interpret (5) as giving individual housing demand (hd(s; t)) as an inverse relation
to housing rental (R(t)). Ceteris paribus, we nd that an increase in desired labor supply
(ls(s; t)), and a corresponding decline in desired leisure demand, is accompanied by a decline
in housing demand. An increase in the wage-rental ratio (v(t)=R(t)) also has the eect of
boosting housing demand. We choose as our numeraire the standardized unit of rental space
and so set the rental rate, R(t), to one in what follows.
Using (5) in the individual's dynamic budget constraint, we obtain
_w(s; t) = [r(t) + ]w(s; t) + v(t)L 

A+ 1
A

hd(s; t): (6)
Using a no-Ponzi game condition that, conditional on being alive at time T , we require
lim
T!1
exp 
R T
t
[r()+]dw(s; T ) = 0;
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we can integrate (6) forward in time to obtain
Z 1
0

A+ 1
A

hd(s; t) exp 
R t
0
[r()+]d dt = w(s; 0) +
Z 1
0
v(t)L exp 
R t
0
[r()+]d dt: (7)
The RHS of (7) gives the sum of nonhuman wealth and what may be called full human wealth.
From (2) and (3), we obtain
_hd(s; t) = [r(t)  ]hd(s; t): (8)
Thus individual housing demand rises if the interest rate is above the subjective rate of time
preference. Integrating (8) to obtain
hd(s; t) = hd(s; 0) exp
R t
0
[r() ]d;
and replacing in (7) gives an individual housing demand function:
hd(s; t) = ( + )

A
A+ 1
 
w(s; t) +
Z 1
t
v()L exp 
R 
t
[r()+]d d

: (9)
Denoting aggregate housing demand by Hd(t) and aggregate nonhuman wealth by W (t),
we obtain the aggregates by integrating over the generations:
Hd(t) =
Z t
 1
hd(s; t) exp (t s) ds; (10)
W (t) =
Z t
 1
w(s; t) exp (t s) ds: (11)
Since the wage rate paid is independent of the cohort, aggregate full human wealth, denoted
W fh, is given by
W fh(t) =
Z 1
t
v()L exp 
R 
t
[r()+]d d: (12)
From (9) then, we obtain the aggregate housing demand function:
Hd(t) = ( + )

A
A+ 1

[W (t) +W fh(t)]: (13)
6
Dierentiating W (t) in (11) with respect to time, we obtain
_W (t) = w(t; t) +
Z t
 1
h
 exp (t s) _w(s; t)  2w(s; t) exp (t s)
i
ds:
Taking note that w(t; t) = 0 and using (6), this equation can be simplied to give
_W (t) = r(t)W (t) + v(t)L 

A+ 1
A

Hd(t): (14)
Dierentiating W fh(t) in (12) with respect to time, we obtain
_W fh(t) =  v(t)L+ [r(t) + ]W fh(t); (15)
and
lim
T!1
W fh(T ) exp 
R T
t
[r()+]d = 0:
Using (13), (14) and (15), we obtain
_Hd(t) = [r(t)  ]Hd(t)  ( + )

A
A+ 1

W (t): (16)
We also note that aggregating across generations in (5), using the normalization R(t) = 1,
gives
Hd(t) = Av(t)[L  Ls(t)]: (17)
Turning to the production side of the model, we assume that the construction sector is
perfectly competitive. Only labor is required to produce a new house or replace an aging one.
With linear technology given by L(t), the following optimal condition must be satised if
there is positive construction activity:
q(t) = v(t); (18)
where q(t) is the price of housing (our asset price) measured in units of standardized rental
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space. Net investment in housing is given by
_H(t) = L(t)  H(t); (19)
where  is the rate of depreciation of housing stock.
In the closed economy, total housing demand must equal to the stock of housing available,
that is, Hd(t) = H(t). Using this condition in (16) and taking note that nonhuman wealth
W (t) is equal to q(t)H(t), we obtain an expression for the real interest rate:
r(t) = + ( + )

A
A+ 1

q(t) +
_H(t)
H(t)
: (20)
For intertemporal equilibrium, the following arbitrage condition must hold:
r(t) =
R(t)
q(t)
+
_q(t)
q(t)
  
=
1
q(t)
+
_q(t)
q(t)
  ; (21)
where we use the normalization R(t) = 1.
Rewriting (19) as
_H(t) = L  [L  L(t)]  H(t);
and then using (17), (18) and the condition Hd(t) = H(t), we make net investment in housing
a function of q(t) and H(t):
_H(t) = L  H(t)
Aq(t)
  H(t): (22)
Notice that by substituting out for _H(t) in (20) using (22), we obtain an expression for r(t)
in terms of H(t) and q(t):
r(t) = + ( + )

A
A+ 1

q(t) +
L
H(t)
  1
q(t)
  : (23)
From (23), we infer that, ceteris paribus, r(t) increases with q(t) but decreases with H(t).
Equating the expressions for r(t) in (20) and (21), and using (22), we obtain the dynamic
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equation that gives the evolution of q(t) over time:
_q(t) =

+ ( + )

A
A+ 1

q(t)

q(t) +
q(t)L
H(t)
 

A+ 1
A

: (24)
Equations (22) and (24) give us the pair of dynamic equations tracing the general-equilibrium
behavior of the economy given an initial stock of housing, H(0).
Around the steady state, the slope of the stationary-H locus is given by
dq(t)
dH(t)

_H(t)=0
=
L
Hss
Hss
A(qss)2
: (25)
In turn, the slope of the stationary-q locus is given by
dq(t)
dH(t)

_q(t)=0
=

1
A+1
 h
L
Hss
i
h
A
(A+1)2
i
( + )Hss +
Hss
A(qss)2
: (26)
Inspecting (25) and (26), we see that
dq(t)
dH(t)

_H(t)=0
>
dq(t)
dH(t)

_q(t)=0
> 0:
The phase diagram characterizing the general-equilibrium evolution of the economy is shown
in Figure 1, where it is readily checked that the system exhibits saddle-path stability. The
saddle path is positively sloped and has the smallest gradient.
The result that the saddle path is positively sloped can be better understood by conduct-
ing the following hypothetical exercise. Starting from an initial steady state, suppose that
individuals waking up in the morning suddenly discover that they have been bequeathed with
a larger stock of houses. The economy nds itself with an excess stock of houses. How does
the economy respond? From (17), there are two ways to boost aggregate housing demand to
equal the suddenly discovered higher stock of houses. The rst is to contract labor supply or
increase leisure demand to enjoy the higher stock of houses; the second is for the wage-rental
ratio or, given our normalization, for the real wage measured in terms of standardized units
of rental space to rise in order to make it aordable for individuals to live in the extra space.
From (18), we nd that the only way for real wages to rise is for housing prices to rise (relative
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to the initial steady-state level). From (21), we have, integrating forward,
q(t) =
Z 1
t
1 exp 
R 
t
[r()+]( t) d: (27)
The stream of current and future rentals, equal to one in each period by our normalization,
must be discounted by current and future instantaneous real rates of interest. The positive
slope of the saddle path means that the sudden discovery of an excess stock of houses (above
the initial steady-state level) results in a sudden rise in q with the expectation formed that
housing prices will then gradually decline. From (21), we infer that the sudden rise in q
accompanied by an expectation of gradually declining asset prices back to the original steady-
state level (absent any other unforseen shock) indeed corresponds to a downward shift of the
term structure of interest rates.
Using (22) with _H(t) = 0 and (24) with _q(t) = 0, we obtain an equation implicitly
determining the steady-state value of q denoted qss:
+  + ( + )

A
A+ 1

qss =
1
qss
: (28)
We infer from (28) that qss is decreasing in the following parameters, the model's \fundamen-
tals" that drive housing prices: ; ;  and A.
Lemma 1: qss = Q(; ; ; A) with Q1 < 0; Q2 < 0; Q3 < 0; Q4 < 0:
The steady-state level of housing stock is readily inferred from the relation
Hss =
Lh
1
Aqss
+ 
i :
Since the sudden discovery of an excess stock of housing owned by the individuals in
the closed economy leads to a rise in housing prices (relative to the initial steady state),
the supply of labor is reduced on account of the wealth eect (\All those houses to enjoy!"
as expressed by Phelps [2010]) but boosted by a positive wage eect (as wages are pulled
up by higher housing prices). Equating the available stock of housing, H(t), to aggregate
housing demand, Hd(t), in (17), and using (18) to substitute out for v(t) in (17), we obtain
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CL(t)  L   Ls(t) = H(t)=[Aq(t)]; so labor supply increases with q(t) but decreases with
H(t). Are we able to determine unambiguously which eect dominates|the wealth eect or
the wage eect? To answer this important question, it is helpful to characterize the general-
equilibrium evolution of the closed economy in terms of another pair of variables|H(t) (the
stock of housing) and CL(t)  L  Ls(t) (the demand for leisure).
We rewrite (22) as
_H(t) = [L  CL(t)]  H(t): (29)
Substituting CL(t)  L  Ls(t) in (17), using (18), setting Hd(t) = H(t), and taking log, we
obtain
logCL(t) = logH(t)  logA  log   log q(t):
Taking the time derivative and then using (24) and (29), we obtain
_CL(t) =
(
ACL(t)
H(t)
  (+ )
)
CL(t) 

A
A+ 1

( + )
 
H(t)
A
!
: (30)
The dynamic evolution of the economy is now summarized by (29) and (30) given an initial
stock of housing H(0).
Around the steady state, the slope of the stationary-H locus is given by
dCL(t)
dH(t)

_H(t)=0
=
 

< 0: (31)
In turn, the slope of the stationary-CL locus is given by
dLC(t)
dH(t)

_CL(t)=0
=
ACLss
(Hss)2
+

1
A+1

(+)
CLss
A
Hss
+

1
A+1

(+)Hss
(CLss)
2
> 0: (32)
The phase diagram characterizing the general-equilibrium evolution of the economy is shown
in Figure 2, where it is readily checked that the system exhibits saddle-path stability. The
saddle path is positively sloped in the H-CL plane and lies in between the two stationary loci.
With the result that the saddle path is positively sloped in the H-CL plane, it is now
clear what the results are of a sudden discovery that the economy is bequeathed with an
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excess stock of housing (relative to the initial steady state). There is a sudden increase in the
demand for leisure, CL, upon the discovery of the excess housing stock. This is due both to a
wealth eect of owning a higher stock of housing as well as a Hicks-Lucas-Rapping interest-rate
eect as lower interest rates due to the excess housing stock lead agents to inter-temporally
substitute towards consumption of leisure in the present. Since CL(t)  L Ls(t), this implies
that there is unambiguously a sudden decrease in labor supply. Combining this nding with
our earlier result that the sudden discovery of excess housing stock leads to a sudden rise in
housing prices, thus to a positive wage eect, this implies that the wealth eect and the Hicks-
Lucas-Rapping interest-rate eect together overcome the positive wage eect. Another way
of interpreting the result is to say that the lower interest rates brought about by the excess
housing stock have two opposing eects: they help to lift up housing prices (relative to steady
state) and thus pull up the demand-wage on one hand but discourage labor supply through
inter-temporal substitution of leisure on the other hand. The positive wage eect, therefore,
can only mitigate the slump in employment due to the wealth eect and the Hicks-Lucas-
Rapping eect but does not dominate it. During the whole period during which the excess
housing stock is worked o as the gross (ow) supply of housing falls below depreciation,
employment is below normal (interpreted as the steady-state level absent another unforseen
shock) though gradually recovering.
Now to complete the analysis, we study possible causes of the excess housing stock. In the
modern economy fraught with uncertainty, it is not unnatural to suppose that the economy
is initially disturbed by an anticipation of higher future housing prices not borne out in
reality. Lemma 1 presents the list of parameters (the model's \fundamentals") that can
raise the steady state level of housing prices. For concreteness, suppose that at time t0
individuals in the economy form an expectation that at future time t1 the subjective rate of
time preference, , will be reduced. As a result, as shown in Figure 3, the index of housing
prices immediately jumps up from E0 to E1 after which it continues to steadily rise along
E1E2. During this phase of a boom in the housing market, we infer from the corresponding
path E1E2 in Figure 4 that there is a steady expansion of employment. Suppose that at time
t2  t1, it is realized that the earlier anticipation of a lower future  is not justied. Contrary
to earlier expectations, fundamentals are in fact unchanged. In Figure 3, there is then an
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abrupt drop in q(t) from E2 to E3 and correspondingly, in Figure 4, there is a sudden drop in
employment as CL(t)  L  Ls(t) jumps up from E2 to E3 and the economy then nds itself
with excess housing stock.
Proposition 1: Suppose that at time t0 individuals in the economy form an expectation
that at future time t1, housing prices will be higher due to a shift in parameters that are
the \fundamentals" determining long-run housing prices in the model. As a result, housing
prices immediately jump up and continue a steady upward climb. During this phase of rising
housing prices, aggregate employment is steadily increasing. When at time t2  t1 it is realized
that the earlier anticipation of a future parametric shift is not justied, there is an abrupt
drop in the index of housing prices followed by a gradual decline to the initial steady state.
With excess housing stock, the whole term structure of interest rates is shifted down in the
post-bubble era, which serves to prop up housing prices and mitigate the employment slump.
3. The small open economy
We now open up the economy that we have been studying to unhindered international capital
mobility and trade in housing services. We study two cases: (a) Foreign and domestic housing
services are perfect substitutes; and (b) Foreign and domestic housing services are imperfect
substitutes.
Foreign and domestic housing services are perfect substitutes
We suppose that the small open economy faces a world interest rate, r, that is paramet-
rically given. We now have the condition that
r(t) = r:
With this condition, the general-equilibrium evolution of the economy can be summarized by
the following system of four equations in the four variables: H(t); q(t);W (t); and CL(t) 
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L  Ls(t) given initial H(0).
_H(t) = [L  CL(t)]  H(t); (33)
_q(t) = (r + )q(t)  1; (34)
_W (t) = rW (t) + q(t)L  (A+ 1)q(t)CL(t); (35)
_CL(t) =
"
1
q(t)
  (+ )
#
CL(t) 
"
( + )
A+ 1
# "
W (t)
q(t)
#
: (36)
We study a linearized version of the dynamic system given by (33) to (36) around the
steady-state (Hss; qss;Wss; C
L
ss) given by
[ _H(t) _q(t) _W (t) _CL(t)]0 = A[H(t) Hss q(t)  qss W (t) Wss CL(t)  CLss]0;
where [  ]0 denotes a column vector, and the 4 4 matrix A contains the following elements:
a11 =   < 0;
a12 = 0;
a13 = 0;
a14 =   < 0;
a21 = 0;
a22 = (r
 + ) > 0;
a23 = 0;
a24 = 0;
a31 = 0;
a32 = L  (A+ 1)CLss ?;
a33 = r
 > 0;
a34 =  (A+ 1)qss < 0;
a41 = 0;
a42 =  C
L
ss
q2ss
+
"
( + )
A+ 1
# "
Wss
q2ss
#
?;
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a43 =  
"
( + )
A+ 1
# "
1
qss
#
< 0;
a44 =
"
1
qss
  (+ )
#
= r    > 0 assumed:
We let the eigenvalues of the system be given by i with i = 1; 2; 3; 4. We can readily check
that the determinant (equal to 1234  a11a22a33a44) is negative so there are either one
negative root plus three positive roots or three negative roots plus one positive root. If there is
only one negative root, we let it be denoted by 1. If there are three negative roots, we denote
the three negative roots by 1, 2 and 3 and assume that 1 is the dominant eigenvalue,
that is, 0 > 1 > 2 > 3. Following the method of dominant eigenvalue proposed by Calvo
(1987), we infer that the system will converge to a ray which is associated with 1.
Let the eigenvector associated with 1 be given by [1 x21 x31 x41]
0. We obtain the system
of equations:
1   a11   a14x41 = 0; (37)
(1   a22)x21 = 0; (38)
 a32x21 + (1   a33)x31   a34x41 = 0; (39)
 a42x21   a43x31 + (1   a44)x41 = 0: (40)
From (38), we see that with (1   a22) < 0, we have x21 = 0. Moreover, from (37), we have
x41 =
1   a11
a14
> 0 for small :
We have the following lemma:
Lemma 2: x21 = 0, and, for small , x41 > 0.
Using Lemma 2, we can draw a diagram like Figure 5. In the top panel, we have a
horizontal line whose intercept is given by qss = (r
 + ) 1 while the bottom panel shows a
positively-sloped asymptotic adjustment path between the index of housing prices and the
stock of housing. In this setting, if the economy is initially at E0 and is suddenly bequeathed
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with an excess stock of housing, q(t) does not change because the excess stock of housing
can be rented to foreigners without aecting housing rentals. The lift to wages and thus
employment found in the closed economy due to a downward shift of the term structure of
interest rates is now no longer operative. The excess stock of housing would have no eect
on employment on account of the wage eect alone. However, as there is a wealth eect, we
observe from the bottom panel in Figure 5 that aggregate employment immediately falls, as
CL(t)  L  L(t) jumps up, and gradually recovers.
In the small open economy here, an expectation formed at current time t0 that the world
interest rate at future time t1 will be reduced can precipitate a sudden rise in the index of
housing prices from E0 to E1 followed by a gradual rise along E1E2. If at time t2  t1,
it is realized that the earlier expectation of higher future housing prices is not based upon
\fundamentals" (here the parameters r and ), there is a sudden drop of housing prices from
E2 to E3 coinciding with the initial steady-state value of qss. Employment falls and follows
the path E3E0.
Proposition 2: Suppose that at time t0 individuals in the small open economy form an
expectation that at future time t1, housing prices will be higher due to a shift in parameters
that are the \fundamentals" determining long-run housing prices in the model. As a result,
housing prices immediately jump up and continue a steady upward climb. During this phase
of rising housing prices, aggregate employment is steadily increasing. When at time t2  t1
it is realized that the earlier anticipation of a future parametric shift is not justied, there is
an abrupt drop in the index of housing prices to the initial steady state. With no change in
the interest rate, there is no longer a mechanism to prop up housing prices to mitigate the
employment slump found to be operative in the closed economy.
Foreign and domestic housing services are imperfect substitutes
Now, we assume that foreign and domestic housing services though tradable are not per-
fectly substitutable. We set foreign rentals, R, to unity and assume that the world interest
rate, r, is constant in terms of foreign units of housing services.
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At time 0, the individual's intertemporal optimization problem can be written as
Maximize
Z 1
0
fA 1[log(L  l(s; t))] + log[(hh(s; t))(hf (s; t))1 ]
+Bg exp (+)t dt
subject to _w(s; t) = [r + ]w(s; t) + v(t)l(s; t) R(t)hh(s; t)  hf (s; t);
given w(s; 0):
Here hd(s; t) is consumption of domestic housing services with housing rental of R(t) and
hf (s; t) is consumption of foreign housing services with housing rental of one.
Let e(s; t)  R(t)hh(s; t) + hf (s; t): Then, static optimization gives
R(t)hh(s; t) = e(s; t); (41)
hf (s; t) = (1  )e(s; t): (42)
Using (41) and (42) in the intertemporal optimization problem, we can rewrite the problem
as
Maximize
Z 1
0
fA 1[log(L  l(s; t))] + log
"
(1  )1 
(R(t))
#
+ log e(s; t) +Bg exp (+)t dt
subject to _w(s; t) = [r + ]w(s; t) + v(t)L  v(t)(L  l(s; t))  e(s; t);
given w(s; 0):
Solving the individual's intertemporal problem gives the following optimal conditions:
A 1
L  l(s; t) = v(t)(s; t); (43)
1
e(s; t)
= (s; t); (44)
_(s; t)
(s; t)
=  [r(t)  ]; (45)
lim
T!1
(s; T )w(s; T ) exp (+)T = 0; (46)
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where (s; t) is the co-state variable. Combining (43) and (44), and eliminating (s; t), we
obtain
e(s; t) = Av(t)[L  ls(s; t)]: (47)
Using (47), the individual dynamic budget constraint can be written as
_w(s; t) = (r + )w(s; t) + v(t)L 

A+ 1
A

e(s; t);
and the individual expenditure function can be written as
e(s; t) = ( + )

A
A+ 1
 
w(s; t) +
Z 1
t
v()L exp 
R 
t
[r()+]d d

:
Aggregating across cohorts in (47), and using v(t) = q(t), we obtain, after re-arranging,
Ls(t) = L  E(t)
Aq(t)
; (48)
where E(t) =
R t
 1  exp
 (t s) e(s; t)ds: We let foreigners' demand for our home housing ser-
vices be given by (1   )E(t)=R(t), where E(t) is aggregate foreign expenditure. The
domestic demand for our home housing services is given by E(t)=R(t). Thus the aggregate
foreigners' and domestic demand for home's housing services is given by
E(t) + (1  )E(t)
R(t)
:
Equating total demand for home's housing services to total stock of housing gives
R(t) =
E(t) + (1  )E(t)
H(t)
: (49)
In what follows, we treat E(t) as exogenous and assume a constant ow.
The general-equilibrium evolution of the economy can be summarized by the following
system of four equations in the four variables: H(t); q(t);W (t); and E(t) given initial H(0).
_H(t) = L  E(t)
Aq(t)
  H(t); (50)
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_q(t) = (r + )q(t)  E(t) + (1  )E

H(t)
; (51)
_W (t) = rW (t) + q(t)L 

A+ 1
A

E(t); (52)
_E(t) = (r   )E(t)  ( + )

A+ 1
A

W (t): (53)
We study a linearized version of the dynamic system given by (50) to (53) around the
steady-state (Hss; qss;Wss; Ess) given by
[ _H(t) _q(t) _W (t) _E(t)]0 = A[H(t) Hss q(t)  qss W (t) Wss E(t)  Ess]0;
where [  ]0 denotes a column vector, and the 4 4 matrix A contains the following elements:
a11 =   < 0;
a12 =
Ess
Aq2ss
> 0;
a13 = 0;
a14 =   1
Aqss
< 0;
a21 =
Ess + (1  )E
H2ss
> 0;
a22 = (r
 + ) > 0;
a23 = 0;
a24 =   
Hss
< 0;
a31 = 0;
a32 = L > 0;
a33 = r
 > 0;
a34 =  

A+ 1
A

< 0;
a41 = 0;
a42 = 0;
a43 =  

A+ 1
A

( + ) < 0;
a44 = r
    > 0 assumed:
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We let the eigenvalues of the system be given by i with i = 1; 2; 3; 4. The determinant is
equal to 1234  a11a22a33a44+a21a32a43a14 a12a21a43a34 and can be positive or negative.
We will treat the case where the determinant is negative so there are either one negative root
plus three positive roots or three negative roots plus one positive root. If there is only one
negative root, we let it be denoted by 1. If there are three negative roots, we denote the
three negative roots by 1, 2 and 3 and assume that 1 is the dominant eigenvalue, that is,
0 > 1 > 2 > 3. Following the method of dominant eigenvalue proposed by Calvo (1987),
we infer that the system will converge to a ray which is associated with 1.
Let the eigenvector associated with 1 be given by [1 x21 x31 x41]
0. We obtain the system
of equations:
1   a11   a12x21   a14x41 = 0; (54)
 a21 + (1   a22)x21   a24x41 = 0; (55)
 a32x21 + (1   a33)x31   a34x41 = 0; (56)
 a43x31 + (1   a44)x41 = 0: (57)
From (54) and (55), we obtain
x21 =
a21 +

a24
a14

(1   a11)
(1   a22) + a24a12a14
;
which can either be positive or negative. From (55), we have
x41 =
 a21 + (1   a22)x21
a24
;
which can also be positive or negative. We have the following lemma:
Lemma 3: x21 and x41 can be either positive or negative.
Using Lemma 3, we can depict a worst-case scenario in Figure 6. In the top panel, we
have a negatively-sloped asymptotic adjustment path between the index of housing prices
and the stock of housing. Then in the bottom panel, we have a positively-sloped asymptotic
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adjustment path between the domestic expenditure and the stock of housing. In this setting, if
the economy is initially at E0 and is suddenly bequeathed with an excess stock of housing, q(t)
drops as housing rentals, R(t), in home decline due to excess supply in the housing market.
Relative to foreign housing rentals (normalized to one), the excess housing stock leads to a
real exchange rate depreciation. The real exchange rate depreciation brought about by the
excess housing stock has a depressing eect on housing prices as
q(t) =
Z 1
t
R() exp (r
+)( t) d:
From (48), we note that aggregate employment falls both because q(t) is down and also
because E(t) is up. The real exchange rate depreciation now exerts a negative wage eect as
q(t) falls below steady state. Thus employment falls both because of a wealth eect as well
as a negative wage eect.
As in the case of perfectly substitutable foreign and domestic housing services, an expecta-
tion formed at current time t0 that the world interest rate at future time t1 will be reduced can
precipitate a sudden rise in the index of housing prices from E0 to E1 followed by a gradual
rise along E1E2. If at time t2  t1, it is realized that the earlier expectation of higher future
housing prices is not based upon \fundamentals" (such as the parameter r), there is a sudden
drop of housing prices from E2 to E3, a level below the initial and nal steady-state value of
qss. Employment falls and follows the path E3E0.
Proposition 3: Suppose that at time t0 individuals in the small open economy form an
expectation that at future time t1, housing prices will be higher due to a shift in parameters
that are the \fundamentals" determining long-run housing prices in the model. As a result,
housing prices immediately jump up and continue a steady upward climb. During this phase
of rising housing prices, aggregate employment is steadily increasing. When at time t2  t1 it
is realized that the earlier anticipation of a future parametric shift is not justied, there is an
abrupt drop in the index of housing prices possibly to a level below the steady state as the
economy goes through a period of real exchange rate depreciation as the excess housing stock
is run down. The real exchange rate depreciation worsens employment as it has a depressing
eect on housing prices and thus a depressing eect on wages.
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4. Conclusion
We have shown how over-investment, in causing the housing stock to get ahead of itself,
has the result that new housing construction will for a period be below its normal path.
Correspondingly, employment will stay for a period below its normal path, a transient slump
after the false boom. This lends theoretical support for the Austrian thesis that when gathering
euphoria brings over-investment, society must pay the price of a temporary slump. In the
closed economy case, the downward shift of the term structure of interest rates due to the
excess housing stock props up housing prices above the normal steady-state level, so the
drop of housing prices \undershoots." Although this transient elevation of housing prices
has a positive demand-wage eect on employment, the wealth eect from owning a higher
housing stock and a negative Hicks-Lucas-Rapping eect of lower interest rates dominate,
so employment drops initially to a below-normal level. The slump gradually subsides as the
housing overhang wears o.
There are two possibilities in the small open economy. If housing services are instanta-
neously tradeable and perfect substitutes for foreign ones, so purchasing power parity holds,
the end of the bubble causes housing prices to drop precisely to the steady-state level. Since
there is no undershooting, the wealth eect of the housing overhang is unopposed and the
slump is deeper. If domestic and foreign housing services are imperfect substitutes, the coun-
try will suer a period with a weak real exchange rate, thus to a drop of housing prices that
\overshoots" the normal level. Here the slump in employment is worsened by the exaggerated
fall in housing prices below the steady-state level.
Appendix
We rst focus on an individual's choice of his time spent in market work, non-market house-
work, and time for leisure. We explicitly model the choice of time spent in three activities:
the market sector, non-market housework, and leisure. Building upon Benhabib, Rogerson
and Wright (1991), we suppose that the period individual utility function is given by
U = log c^+ A0 log[L  lm   ln] +B0; if lm > 0
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= log c^+ A0 log[L  lm   ln]; if lm = 0;
where A0; B0 > 0 and c^  hc1 n , 0 <  < 1. Here, L is time endowment, lm is time spent
working in the market sector, ln is time spent in non-market housework, h is consumption of
housing services, and cn is consumption of the home produced non-market good. We assume
that the non-market good is produced according to cn = snln; sn > 0: Notice that as in
Benhabib, Rogerson and Wright (1991), we suppose that working in the market sector gives
positive direct utility, presumably because one enjoys certain social interactions and types of
mental stimulation at the work place that one does not get by devoting all of one's time to
leisure and homework. We assume that there is a xed positive utility value from working in
the market sector (given by B0) that is independent of the actual number of hours worked.
In contrast, the utility value derived from housework comes indirectly from consuming the
home-produced good generated by the time input into the non-market sector.
To ensure that every living person in the economy spends a positive amount of time
working in the market in order to facilitate aggregation, we make the assumption that the
direct utility value from spending a positive amount of time in the market is suciently large.
(See Assumption 1 below.)
The agent maximizes
Z 1
t
flog[(h(s; ))(cn(s; ))1 ] + A0 log[L  ln(s; )  lm(s; )]
+B0gexp (+)( t)d
subject to
cn(s; t) = snln(s; t);
dw(s; t)
dt
= [r(t) + ]w(s; t) + v(t)lm(s; t) R(t)h(s; t);
and a transversality condition that prevents agents from going indenitely into debt. As in
Blanchard (1985), agents save or dissave by buying or selling actuarial bonds, that is, bonds
that are cancelled by death. Here,  is the subjective rate of time discount,  is the constant
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instantaneous probability of death so  1 is the expected remaining life, w(s; t) is non-human
wealth at time t of an agent born at time s, R(t) is housing rental, and v(t) is wage rate.5
The rate of interest on actuarial bonds is r(t) + .
From the optimal choice of h, lm, and ln, we obtain, after some manipulation, the following
two relationships:
v
h
=
A0
L  ln   lm ; (58)
(1  )sn
cn
=
A0
L  ln   lm : (59)
Using these two equations to get cn=h = (1   )sn(L   lm)[(A0 + (1   ))h] 1, and using
cn = snln, we further obtain ln = (1  )(A0) 1[ L  ln   lm]. We can then eliminate ln and cn
and write the individual's intertemporal optimization problem simply as
Maximize
Z 1
t
flog h(s; ) + A 1 log[L  lm(s; )] +Bg exp (+)( t) d
subject to
dw(s; t)
dt
= [r(t) + ]w(s; t) + v(t)lm(s; t) R(t)h(s; t); (60)
where
A 1   1[A0 + (1  )];
B   1(1  ) log
"
(1  )sn
A0 + (1  )
#
+  1A0 log
"
A0
A0 + (1  )
#
+B0 1:
We make a notational change in the main text and drop the \m" subscript to denote market
work. Thus, l(s; t) replaces lm(s; t) with the understanding that l(s; t) is the individual's
supply of labor to the market sector.
We make the following assumption:
Assumption 1: B > A 1[log L  log(L  0+)]:
5We assume that the wage per hour worked in the market is independent of the age of the agent.
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Under Assumption 1, a very wealthy individual who might have chosen to retire in a model
without a positive utility value from market work spends a very small positive amount of time
working in the market (lm = 0
+ > 0) given the positive utility value of market work compared
to housework in our model.
References
Benhabib, Jess, Richard Rogerson, and Randall Wright, 1991, \Homework in
Macroeconomics: Household Production and Aggregate Fluctuations," Journal of Political
Economy, 99, December, 1166-87.
Blanchard, Olivier, 1985, \Debts, Decits and Finite Horizons," Journal of Political
Economy, 93, April, 223-47.
Calvo, Guillermo, 1987. \Real Exchange Rate Dynamics with Nominal Parities: Structural
Change and Overshooting," Journal of International Economics, 22, 141-55.
Hoon, Hian Teck, 2011, \Payroll Taxes, Wealth and Employment in Neoclassical Theory:
Neutrality or Non-Neutrality?" in Edmund S. Phelps and Hans Werner Sinn (eds.), The
Performance of Continental Economies, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
and Edmund S. Phelps, 1996, \Payroll Taxes and VAT in a Labor-Turnover Model of
the `Natural Rate'," International Tax and Public Finance, 3, 369-83.
Obstfeld, Maurice, 1989, \Fiscal Decits and Relative Prices in a Growing World Economy,"
Journal of Monetary Economics, 23(3), May, 461-84.
Phelps, Edmund, 2010, \The Slump, the Recovery, and the `New Normal'," Center Working
Paper No. 61, June, Center on Capitalism and Society, Columbia University.
Weil, Philippe, 1989, \Overlapping Families of Innitely-Lived Agents," Journal of Public
Economics, 38, 183-98.
Zoega, Gyl, 2010, \The Financial Crisis: Joblessness and Investmentlessness," Center
Working Paper No. 62, July, Center on Capitalism and Society, Columbia University.
25
ݍ௧
ܪ௧
̇ = 0
ݍ௧̇ = 0
Saddle-path
ܪ௧
Figure 1: Saddle-path stability in H-q plane in closed economy
ܥ௧
௅
̇ܥ௧
௅ = 0
Saddle-path
ܪ௧
̇ = 0
ܪ௧
Figure 2: Saddle-path stability in H-ܥ௅ plane in closed economy
ݍ௧ ܧଶ
ܪ௧
̇ = 0
ܧଵ ݍ௧̇ = 0
ܧଷ
ܧ଴
ܪ௧
Figure 3: Housing bubble and aftermath in closed economy in H-q plane
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Figure 4: Housing bubble and aftermath in closed economy in H-ܥ௅ plane
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Figure 5: Housing bubble and aftermath in small open economy with
perfectly substitutable foreign and domestic housing services
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Figure 6: Housing bubble and aftermath in small open economy with
imperfectly substitutable foreign and domestic housing services
